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State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper
112 S.W.3d 397 (Mo. 2003)
L Faz
Christopher Simmons ("Simmons") at the age of seventeen was sentenced
to death for murder.' Due to the United States Supreme Court's opinion in
Starfod v K udky,2 Simmons did not argue that his age constituted a bar to the
imposition of the death penalty.' The Supreme Court ruled in Staw&d that no
national consensus existed that required a ban on the execution of those who
were sixteen or seventeen years old at the time of their crimes.' The Supreme
Court of Missouri affirmed Simmons's conviction and sentence of death and
denied him postconviction relief.' On petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
Simmons argued that a new national consensus had developed since Sta4md 
6
Simmons argued that to execute him for a crime he committed while under the
age of eighteen would constitute cruel and unusual punishment!
IL Hddig
The Supreme Court of Missouri held that waiver rules did not apply to
preclude the petitioner's claim.8 The court set aside Simmons's death sentence
and "resentence[d] him to life imprisonment without eligibility for probation,
parole, or release except by act of the Governor."9 Further, the court held that
the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of those defendants under the
age of eighteen at the time their capital crimes were committed."0
1. State ix ni Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 399 (Mo. 2003) (en banc); see State v.
Simmons, 944 S.W.2d 165, 170 (Mo. 1997) (stating that at trial the jury returned a verdict of guilty
and a recommendation for a death sentence, which the judge imposed).
2. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
3. Simrn, 112 S.W.3d at 399; seStanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361,380 (1989) (holding
that the "imposition of capital punishment" on a defendant who murdered at sixteen or seventeen
"does not offend the EigXth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment").
4. Sinnm, 112 S.W.3d at 399 (citing Swraf 492 U.S. at 380).
5. Si=rn, 944 S.W.2d at 169.
6. Sim=, 112 S.W.3d at 399.
7. Id
8. Id at 400.
9. Id
10. Id at 399-400.
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Iff. A n &Ais
A. RebradwApp iwqfdx Darh Penky
Because Simmons did not argue an Eighth Amendment violation at the time
of his trial, the State contended that the Supreme Court of issouri should not
address the substantive issue of whether the execution of those under the age of
eighteen at the time they committed their crimes is prohibited bythe Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution."' The court relied on the first
exception to the rule of nonretroactivityexpressed in Taeguev Lan' and rejected
this argument." The first exception applies to rules that place "certain kinds of
primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making
power to proscribe." 4 Nine years after Tag, the United States Supreme Court
in Penmyv Lymugl expanded the first exception of Taegzeto cover new rules that
prohibit a certain class of punishment for a group of defendants because of their
status or offense.' 6 The Supreme Court of Missouri concluded that if the Eighth
Amendment prohibits the execution of persons under eighteen at the time of
their offense "regardless of the procedures followed.., such a rule would... fall
under the first exception to nonretroactivity under Teq&& because it would
deprive the state of the power to impose the punishment of death on such a
person.""' The court concluded that such a rule would be applicable to defen-
dants in Simmons's position- those whose cases are on collateral review- and
that the usual waiver rules would not be applicable.1
B. Natwdi Cwmerzx A gat the Exeatm i fl]teniI ani theMent ay Rarded
The Supreme Court of M fissouri began its analysis of whether a national
consensus had formed in opposition to the juvenile death penalty by examining
11. Id at 400.
12. 489 US. 288 (1989).
13. Sira, 112 S.W.3d at400-01;seeTeaguev. Lane, 489 US. 288,311(1989) (holdingthat
new criminal procedural rules, which are not based on prior precedent, do not apply to defendants
who have received final judgments unless the rule falls within two narrow exceptions).
14. Tugue 489 US. at 311 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971)
(Harlan, J., concuning in part, dissenting in part)).
15. 492 U.S. 302 (1998).
16. Penryv. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 (1998).
17. Sim=s, 112 S.W.3d at 400-01.
18. I at 400. The court also noted that the meptallyretarded petitioner in Akin v. Virginia
536 US. 304, 321 (2002), triggered retroactive protection under the first ubstantive Terue
exception. Id The first substantive Tatge exception applied to Atkins because the Constitution
"'phaces a substantive restriction on the State's power to take the life'.of a mentally retarded
offender." Id (quoting Atzim, 536 US. at 321).
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Supreme Court "cases addressing the execution of juveniles and of the mentally
retarded."' 9
1. DtPenltyari arnJw
,z Thompson v. Oklahoma
The Supreme Court in T7pmn v Ok °hamW held that the Eighth and the
Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the execution of defendants who were fifteen
years old or younger "at the time of the offense."21 Writing the principal opin-
ion, Justice Stevens explained that judges should determine what constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment while being " 'guided by the evolving standards of
decencythat mark the progress of a maturing society.'"" To determine what the
current standards of decency are, 7/ zm explored the following factors: (1)
relevant legislative actions; (2) evidence of how juries viewed the imposition of
the death penalty, (3) views of national and international organizations; and (4)
the Court's independent analysis of the "propriety of such executions."23
Exploring these factors more fully, the Thcwpn Court recognized that no
legislature had adopted a statute that clearly permitted the execution of those
under the age of sixteen. 4 The Court found that juries rarely imposed the death
penalty on those under the age of sixteen, and in the five times between 1982 and
1986 when juries did impose death sentences on defendants under the age of
fifteen, those offenders received sentences that were" 'cruel and unusual in the
same waythat being struck by lightning is cruel and unusuaL' 2 As part of the
Court's discussion of legislation, the Court examined the views of other nations,
national religious groups, and social and professional groups and found that there
existed a consensus against such executions.26 Under the Court's independent
analysis, the Justices considered juvenile culpabilityand the purposes of the death
penalty- deterrence and retribution The Court concluded that because so few
juveniles fifteen years old or younger were executed, applying a prohibition on
19. Id
20. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
21. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 US. 815, 838 (1988).
22. Sirmm, 112 S.W.3d at 401 (quoting 7bt po, 487 U.S. at 821) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
23. Id The Supreme Court of Missouri erroneously listed a factor 77bprn relied on to
determine a standard of decency a" evidence of how juries viewed the propriety of execution of
the mentally retarded." ld Nowhere in 7bipon does the court discuss the execution of the
mentally retarded. The court likely meant that standards of evolving decency should take into
account evidence of how juries view the execution of those under sixteen years of age.
24. Id at 401-02 (citing 7hrnwpn 487 US. at 829).
25. Id at 402 (quoting 7Thrricr 487 US. at 832-33).
26. Id
27. Id at 402.
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the execution of those under sixteen would not jeopardize the death penalty's
deterrent value.2" Taking these factors and evidence into consideration, the
Court concluded that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibited the
execution of defendants under the age of sixteen at the time their crimes were
committed and that the execution of that class of defendants constituted cruel
and unusual punishment because a national consensus had emerged to this
effect."
b. Stanford v. Kentucky
The Court decided Stanford v Kenu&y the year after it decided Thw n30
In Stafor4 Justice Scalia wrote the principal opinion and held that the Eighth
Amendment did not prohibit the execution of those who committed crimes
while theywere sixteen or seventeen years old."l Agreeing "that what constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment must be determined" bycurrent standards,Justice
Scalia determined that "current standards are almost entirelyto be determined by
reference to 'statutes passed bysociety's elected representatives,' and specifically
bystate legislatures."32 Scalia noted that of those states that permitted the death
penalty, the majority of those states allowed execution of sixteen- or seventeen-
year-olds3
"Although Stafod recognized that juries sentence substantially fewer
juveniles than adults to death," the Court held that this did not provide a reason
entirely to prohibit death sentences of those under eighteen?4 Additionally,
although only one year earlier in Thmon the Court examined views of social,
religious and professional groups, as well as the opinions of other nations,
S&ford stated that the views of national organizations rested on " 'uncertain
foundations'" and that international opinions were irrelevant in determining
whether a national consensus existed. Having so limited the factors to consider,
the Court found that there had not yet developed a national consensus against
the execution of defendants who were sixteen or seventeen years old at the time
they committed their offenses. 6
28. 71rpci4 487 U.S. at 837.
29. Sinn, 112 S.W.3d at 402.
30. Id; swStaqonwi 492 US. at 361 (stating the case was decided in 1989).
31. Simw, 112 S.W.3d at 402 (citing Stalfo, 492 US. at 370-77).
32. Id at 402-03 (quoting Stazfon 492 US. at 370).
33. Id at 403 (citing Stwfom 492 U.S. at 370).
34. Id (citing St aqo 492 US. at 370).
35. Id (quoting Stat#&d, 492 US. at 369 n.1, 377).
36. Id (citing Statfd4 492 U.S. at 370-72).
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2. Dath Pmtyand the Mtaly Retand
a Penry v. Lynaugh
The same daythat Stwjodwas decided, the Court in Pemqysimilarlydeclared
that there was no national consensus against the "imposition of the deathpenalty
on the mentally retarded."3" The Court again stated that the concept of"what
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment is not a 'static' concept."' As in
Starfon the Court looked at state statutes and determined that theywere the best
measure of how societyviews a particular issue." Additionally, the Court looked
at data with respect to sentencing juries. 0
b. Atkins v. Virginia
In 2002, the Court in A tkir v Vibgna 41 re-examined the issue of executing
a mentally retarded defendant.42 The Court once again stated the need to exam-
ine the issue as a fluid process of evolving determinations "of what constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment."4" The Supreme Court of Missouri found that
the Court's analysis in A tkim more closely resembled 7bxron than Swfmd"
Following the relevant factors from A tkins, as the Supreme Court of Missouri
understood them, the court examined the following: (1) "the objective evidence
of legislative intent;" (2) "the frequency with which the death penalty was ap-
plied" to mentallyretarded defendants; (3) the opinions of religious, professional
and social organizations as well as the opinions of other nations; and (4) the
evolving standards of decency. The Court stated that since Pemy had been
decided thirteen years earlier, fourteen additional states adopted legislation
barring the death penaltyfor the mentallyretarded.' The Court noted that in the
37. Sinmms, 112 S.W.3d at 403; seePmrA 492 US. at 340 (holding that the Eighth Amend-
ment does not preclude execution of a "mentally retarded person simply by virtue of his or her
mental retardation alone").
38. Sin mi, 112 S.W.3d at 403 (citing PrA 492 U.S. at 330).
39. Id The Court in Pmy noted that onlytwo states and the federal government prohibited
the execution of the mentally retarded. Id VWhen those two states were added to the fourteen
States that completely prohibited the sition of the death penalty, the Court concluded there
was still insufficient evidence to declare a national consensus had been formed. Id at 403-04.
40. Id at 403-04. The Court noted that Penry was not able to "provide evidence that juries
chose not to sentence mentally retarded defendants to death." Id at 404. Additionally, the Court
noted that it was unable to conclude that all mentallyretarded defendants were not capable of acting
"with the level of culpability associated with the death penalty" Id
41. 536 US. 304 (2002).
42. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,306-07 (2002).
43. Sbmixvz, 112 S.W.3d at 404 (citing Atkin, 536 U.S. at 312).
44. Id
45. Id (citing A kirs, 536 U.S. at 313-16).
46. Id In addition, the Court noted that one state had passed such a resolution only to have
2003]
CAPITAL DEFENSE JOURNAL
states that still allowed the execution of the mentally retarded, only five such
people had been executed since Pemy.'4 The Court noted that several mental
ealth organizations, the nation's religious communities, and the world commu-
nity were largely against "the execution of the mentally retarded."" The Court,
in its independent analysis, found that neither retribution nor the need for
deterrence was furthered by allowing the execution of the mentally retarded.49
Rejecting the assertion that the effect of mental retardation should only be
considered as mitigating evidence, the Court stated that the fact that these
defendants are mentally retarded makes them less able to assist effectively their
counsel in the preparation of their defenses.' The Court concluded that" 'death
is not a suitable punishment for a mentally retarded criminal.' ",1
C Apphauz qf Iena to th Exetco cfiwo l 6 TodIay
The Supreme Court of Missouri concluded that because A tkim reaffirmed
that the standard of decencyshould be governed bypresent-dayprinciples, it had
the authority and the obligation to determine Sinmons's case in light of current
standards of decency.5 2 The dissent agreed with the State's argument that the
court was bound bythe United States Supreme Court's decision in Staro until
the Supreme Court revisits the issue. 3 The Supreme Court of Missouri utilized
the A tkim approach to determine if a new national consensus had "developed
against the application of the juvenile death penalty since Swod"s
The court examined the developments that led to a national consensus
against the execution of the mentally retarded in the years between Pery and
A tki&, Noting that the Supreme Court in A tkis relied heavily on the fact that
it be rejected by the Governor, while in two other states, barring the execution of the mentally
retarded had been considered by at least one house of the legislature. Id
47. Id at 405. The Court related that "[t]he practice... has become truly unusual, and it is
fair to saythat a national consensus has developed against it." Id (quoting A tkis, 536 U.S. at 316).
48. Id The Court cited polling data to support its assertion that the consensus in the United
States was against the practice of executing the mentally retarded. Id
49. SbimZ, 112 S.W.3d at 406 (citing A tkiri, 536 U.S. at 319).
50. Id (citing A tkin, 536 U.S. at 320-21).
51. Id (quoting A nim, 536 US. at 321).
52. Id The court argued that the Court's decision in Starybnd does not bind it because the
"fundamental premises" on which all precedent lies is that the courts have an interest in protecting
the Eighth Amendment in a "flexible and dynamic manner." Id at 406-07 (citing Stafom 492 U.S.
at 369).
53. Id at 406. The dissent noted that StarW is direct and controlling Supreme Court
precedent. Id at 419 (Price, J., dissenting). The dissent stated that the Missouri court is bound by
the Star#ni decision and concluded that the court lacked the authorty to adjudicate such issues
when there is such direct precedent. Id The dissent did not address the Talgueissue.
54. Id at 407.
55. SMirm, 112 S.W.3d at 408.
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in the years between Pemry and A dkim sixteen states had instituted bans on the
execution of the mentally retarded and that the consistency of the trend contin-
ued in that direction, the Supreme Court of Missouri examined evidence and
concluded that there was the same consistency of change in opposition to the
juvenile death penalty.s6 The court noted that at the time of Sulmeleven states
barred the death penalty for juveniles under eighteen at the time of their offense,
but currently, a total of sixteen states, federal civilian courts, and military courts
require the minimum age of eighteen before imposition of death."7 The court
stated that, since StarFoa no state has lowered the age for execution below the
age of eighteen, even though Statyddoes not preclude such a practice and many
states have considered legislation to raise the minimum age of execution."
The court noted that, of the states that permit the imposition of the death
penalty on juvenile offenders, only six have executed a juvenile offender since
Stargi was decided. 9 Of the six states that executed a juvenile, only three did
so in the last ten years.' The court stated that only twenty-two of the 366
recorded executions of juveniles in this country occurred between 1973 and
2003.61 When juries have imposed the death penalty on juveniles since the
reinstatement of the death penalty in 1976, the court stated that those sentences
have routinely been reversed for a variety of reasons.62 Finally, the court noted
that because of the small number of executions of juveniles, the legislatures in
states with a juvenile death penalty may not have had a reason to bar it.63
When examining the national and international consensuses against the
imposition of the juvenile death penalty, the court noted that, since Staf#o4
additional professional and religious groups have voiced their opposition to such
punishment.' Although Stfddid not rely on opposition from social, political
and religious groups, the Court's more recent decision inA zim shifted back to
relying on such evidence to determine if a national consensus existed to prohibit
56.. Id; seA dw,, 536 U.S. at 315-16 (recognizing the importance of the consistency of the
direction of the change with respect to how the death penalty as it relates to the mentally retarded
is viewed).
57. Sinmv, 112 S.W.3d at 408. The court noted that sixteen is "only two fewer than the
eighteen states" that prohibited the execution of a mentally retarded defendant inA tkiS. Id
58. Id at 408-09.
59. Id at 409.
60. Id
61. Id The court related that of those twentytwo executions of juvenile defendants, 81%
occurred in Texas, Oklahoma, and Virginia. Id The court stated that since the death penalty was
reinstated, more mentally retarded people have been executed than juveniles. Id at 410.
62. Id at 409.
63. Sim=, 112 S.W.3d at 410.
64. Id The court provided an extended list of those organizations with anti-juvenile death
penaltyviews. Id at 410-11.
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the execution of the mentally retarded. 5 The Supreme Court of Missouri found
strong opposition to the juvenile death penaltywithin both the United States and
the international communities.66
Upon conclusion of its own independent examination, the court found that
"neither retribution nor deterrence provides an effective rationale for the imposi-
tion of the juvenile death penalty, and the risk of wrongful execution of juveniles
is enhanced for reasons similar to that set out in A tkim in regard to the mentally
retarded."6 The court acknowledged the scientific and psychological studies that
the defense presented to assert that maturityis not fully reached until continued
growth stops, but failed to address these studies concluding that the Supreme
Court already recognized the "lesser culpability and developing nature of the
adolescent mind in its 1988 decision in 7/pmon."68 The Supreme Court of
Missouri concluded that a seventeen-year-old and a fifteen-year-old are both
adolescents and, therefore, the 7baxmon rationale should apply.69 Similarly,
because the juvenile death penaltyis applied so infrequently, the court concluded
that the deterrence function of the death penalty has little impact on juveniles.70
Finally, the court noted that the risk of wrongful execution is greater "with
younger offenders, who have had less time to develop ties to the community, less
time to perform mitigating good works, and less time to develop a stable work
history, than is true of adult offenders, and who are far more likely than adults
to waive their rights and to give false confessions."" The court noted that, in
Missouri, a juvenile defendant can use age as a mitigating circumstance; however,
as was the case with Simmons, age can also be used by the prosecution.' In
Simmons's case, to give the jury more incentive to impose the death penalty, the
prosecution used age to suggest younger offenders feel greater immorality and
pose an added future danger to society.3
The concurrence in Sinnm stated that although it agreed with the major-
ity's result, "the use of chronological age in making" judgments for Eighth
65. Id at 411; seA tkesi, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21 (citing evidence from social, political and
religious groups of a national consensus against execution of the mentally retarded).
66. Sinmi, 112 S.W.3d at 411. The court noted that other international organizations and
treaties such as the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child strictly oppose the
execution of juveniles. Id
67. Id
68. Id The court in 775pmon stated that "[ilnexperience, less education, and less intelligence
make the teenager less able to evaluate the consequences of his or her conduct while at the same
time he or she is much more apt to be motivated by mere emotion or peer pressure than is an
adult." Id (quoting 71ptr, 487 U.S. at 835).
69. Id
70. Id at 413.
71. Id
72. Sinrrz, 112 S.W.3d at 413.
73. Id
[Vol. 16:1
STATE EX REL. SIMMONS V ROPER
Amendment purposes "invites the drawing of a bright line as to the age at which
a murder defendant may be subject to the death penalty." 4 The concurrence
stated that a better test to utilize would involve presumptions."5 A sixteen- or
seventeen-year-old would be "presumed not to have the capacity to be fully
responsible and therefore" ineligible for the death penalty 6 The State, according
to the concurrence, should shoulder the burden of overcoming that presumption,
which would leave to the jury, rather than the courts, the determination of the
eligibility of the defendant for the death penalty.
IV. Applihaaiwn in Vb*?ia
In Virginia juvenile cases, counsel should count Missouri as an additional
state that has judicially abolished the juvenile death penalty. Informing the court
of other states that have abolished the juvenile death penalty adds to the credibil-
ityof the defendant's Eighth Amendment argument that sentencing a juvenile to
death is cruel and unusual punishment. In addition, Sirm adds to the mount-
ing evidence of a changing national consensus.
In order for a defense teamto take advantage of a new Supreme Court case,
it must fall within one of the two Tage exceptions. If A tkvir is an exception to
Teague because it " 'places a substantive restriction on the state's power to take
the life' of a mentally retarded offender," then it is analytically similar to the
Em wrdv Foikda and Ton v A ?izad 9 factors or pre-sixteen juvenality because
mental retardation would act as a gateway to the imposition of the death
penalty 0 The State has the burden of proving these gaiewayelements before the
defendant is death eligible. If Sinnm survives the Supreme Court, the same will
74. Id at 415 (Wolff, J., concurring).
75. Id at 416-17 (Wolff, J., concurring),
76. Id
77. Id at 417 (WolffJ., concurring). The concurrence stated that "[individualized treatment.
in juvenile death penalty cases would preserve the capital sentencing option while eliminating or
diminihing the comparative injustice problem associated with line-drawing governed solely
according to a defendant's age." Id at 418 (Wolff, J., concurring).
78. 458 US. 782 (1982).
79. 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
80. Sirnm, 112 S.W.3d at 400 (quotingA teu, 536 US. at 321); seeEmund v. Florida, 458
U.S. 782, 801 (1982) (holding that a sentence of death was excessive and in violation of the Eighth
Amendment when imposed on an accomplice to murder); Tson v. Arizona, 481 US. 137, 156-58
(1987) (holding that if the individualized inquiry into the defendant's culpability reveals major
participation in the felony and reckless indifference to human life, the culpability requirement of
E rmwi is sufficient to warrant imposition of the death penalty). The Enmrd and T m factors act
as a gateway in the federal system in order to reach jury consideration of a death sentence. Se 18
U.S.C S 3591(a) (2000) (requiring the defendant to have acted intentionally in order to be death
eligible); 21 U.S.C S 848(n) (2000) (listing the aggravating factors that make a defendant death
eliible). Se grnIly Kristen F. Grunewald, Case Note, 15 CAP. DEF. J. 117 (2002) (analyzing
Afinsv. Virginia, 122 S. Q. 2242 (2002)).
2003]
CAPITAL DEFENSE JOURNAL
be true of pre-eighten juvenality. In Virginia, the Commonwealth would be
forced to prove that the defendant committed a death-eligible crime while over
the age of eighteen. If the Commonwealth failed to establish this fact, then the
defendant could not be sentenced to death.
V. Cadmion
The Supreme Court of Mlissouri found that the national consensus had
shifted since the Supreme Court considered Stau and that the imposition of
the death penalty on defendants who were under the age of eighteen when they
committed their crimes is unconstitutional8' Thus, according to the Supreme
Court of Hssouri, the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment prohibits the juvenile death penalty. 2 Despite the control-
ling Supreme Court precedent, the court concluded that because cruel and
unusual punishment is measured by evolving standards of decency, the shift in
the national consensus justifies the court's ruling. 3
Meghan II Morgan
81. S mms, 112 S.W.3d at 399.
82. Id at 400.
83. Id at 399.
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